[ad#200×200]WITH THE ARMY steadily advancing on the remaining LTTE strongholds east of A9 and north of the Mankulam-Mullaitivu road, three runways located in this area will never be able to be used at least once, to bring in an arms load.
The runways will come within artillery and mortar range as the area under LTTE controls shrinks. But the SLAF is not taking any chances. “We are mindful of the possibility,” SLAF Chief Air Marshal Roshan Goonetileke told The Island.
He said that the LTTE could make a desperate attempt to bring in an ammunition load but even if it succeeded, it wouldn’t make a difference. Asserting that the LTTE couldn’t alter the course of the war, the SLAF chief emphasised the importance of thwarting a possible attempt to introduce a new weapon which hadn’t been hitherto used in Sri Lanka.
Of the two runways located in the Iranamadu area, the one situated east of the Iranamadu tank is believed to have been abandoned. The third one is located at Mulliyawalai close to Mullaitivu. The abandoned airstrip is within artillery range.
“The Island” in an exclusive front-page report on August 15 revealed SLAF attacks on the runway at Mulliyawalai. The SLAF launched attacks against the backdrop of reconnaissance carried out by an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) which revealed an attempt to expand the runaway.
Goonetileke acknowledged that the runways located on the eastern flank had been built especially to accommodate aircraft brining in supplies, as they were needlessly long for fixed wing aircraft used in attacks. Since the first attack launched on the Katunayake air base on March 26 last year, the LTTE targeted Palaly (April 24, 2007), the Oil refinery at Kolonnawa and a storage complex at Muthurajawela (April 29, 2007), the Anuradhapura air base (October 22, 2007), Weli Oya army command (April 26, 2008), Eastern naval area headquarters (August 26, 2008), Vavuniya air base (September 9, 2008) and Kelanitissa power plant (October 28, 2008).
Although the 59 Division deployed on the eastern flank hadn’t so far come across any airstrip, the army on the western flank located two. The 57 Division on September 29 captured an airstrip at Panikkankulam, about seven kilometres north-west of Mankulam. Army Chief, Lt. General Sarath Fonseka told The Island that the over 500 metre long airstrip could have been used by small fixed wing aircraft. The Task Force I pushing towards Paranthan along Pooneryn-Paranthan road on November 20 located an indigenous attempt to use a section of the road between 15th and 18 kilometre posts.
The LTTE wouldn’t have been forced even to think of brining in supplies by air, had it survived a series of operations executed by the navy on the high seas under Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda’s leadership. The Jane’s, in an article headlined Fight and flight-The LTTE’s air cargo ambitions released on November 13, 2008, mentioned the SLN’s proven ability to identify, intercept and sink rogue ships, combined with the growing difficulties in landing their cargoes, may well have encouraged a shift towards air deliveries.
The navy chief told The Island that adequate assets had been deployed to thwart attempts to land supplies between Nayaru and Nagarkovil, the only available coastal landing sites. Expressing confidence that the navy could meet the challenge, he said that LTTE access to the sea had been reduced to about 44 nautical miles on the eastern coast.
With the LTTE losing assess to coastal landing sites along the north-western coast due to the recently concluded offensive to regain Pooneryn, it wouldn’t be able to use the Gulf of Mannar supply route. Karannagoda said that they were mindful of the LTTE attempts to circumvent security forces siege on their remaining strongholds.
Courtesy: The Island